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Abstract
This article proposes definitions of lying, deception, and damage in
strategic settings. Lying depends on the existence of accepted mean-
ings for messages, but does not require a model of how the audience
responds to messages. Deception does require a model of how the au-
dience interprets messages, but does not directly refer to consequences.
Damage requires consideration of the consequences of messages. Lies
need not be deceptive. Deception does not require lying. Lying and
deception are compatible with equilibrium. I give conditions under
which deception must be damaging.
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1 Introduction
Communication is an essential part of social interaction. In order to investi-
gate when and why goal-oriented actors communicate effectively, it is useful
to clarify basic terms. This paper proposes definitions of lying and deception
and derives properties of these definitions in a simple strategic context. My
approach is abstract, but the ideas are substantively relevant and topical.
Many issues in policy and law involve attempts to limit how people share
information. Consumer agencies make and enforce regulations designed to
protect agents from deceptive practices. Existing policies lack a consistent
framework. I hope that this paper helps to provide a foundation for fu-
ture discussions of policies that identify and limit dishonest and deceptive
practices.
Loosely, a lie is a statement that the speaker believes is false. This def-
inition requires an accepted interpretation of the meaning of words, but it
does not require a model of the speaker’s intentions or the expected conse-
quences of the statement. An implication of this definition is that one does
not need to know how the audience will interpret in order to a statement
to evaluate whether the statement is a lie. People do make statements to
influence others. I reserve the term deception to describe statements – or
actions – that induce the audience to have incorrect beliefs. Making these
ideas precise requires a formal model, which I introduce in Section 2. The
basic model makes strong assumptions, but is general enough for most of the
analysis in the paper. In Section 8, I discuss ways to extend the model.
I use the model to develop definitions that parallel a classification intro-
duced by Austin [5]. Austin distinguishes between three different properties
of speech acts. Locution is what the speaker says. Illocution refers to
the interpretation of what she says. Perlocution is the consequences of the
statement.
I define lies purely in terms of locution. Section 3 uses the model to dis-
cuss lying. To conduct the analysis, I add the concept of a common language
to a two-player (Sender-Receiver) model of communication. After I present a
definition of lying in Section 3.1, Section 3.2 briefly reviews the extensive lit-
erature that offers definitions of lying and the extent to which my definition
conforms with usage in other disciplines. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 discuss prop-
erties of lying in strategic settings. I identify games in which lying must arise
in equilibrium and other situations in which it need not arise. Two central
observations are that fully anticipated lies need not interfere with exchange
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of information and that the ability to lie may have both positive and negative
welfare consequences. These observations are immediate consequences of the
definitions. My contribution is to place them in a coherent framework.
Unlike lying, deception does require a “theory of mind.” The speaker
must have a model of how the audience interprets her behavior. I assume
that the speaker has beliefs about how the audience will interpret her actions.
Deception is therefore an illocutionary act. When the Sender contemplates
an action, she can figure out how the action influences the Receiver. Section 4
discusses beliefs. This section begins with a discussion of beliefs and provides
a definition of deception. Informally, the Sender’s behavior is deceptive if
(according to her model of the Receiver’s behavior) it leads the Receiver to
have inferior beliefs about the state of the world. To make this informal
notion formal, I must describe what it means for beliefs to be inferior. In my
definition, inducing inferior beliefs means sending a message that leads to
beliefs that are “further from the truth” than beliefs that could be induced
by another feasible message. Section 4.1 gives a precise definition of what it
means to be further from the truth. There are different ways to formalize
the notion of inaccurate beliefs and poor decisions. I discuss alternatives in
Section 5.4 after I consider the consequences of deception.
I discuss properties of deception in Section 4.2. Lies and deception are
different. Deception is possible without lying. Lies need not deceive. De-
ception is only possible if the Receiver is open to influence. If the Receiver
ignores the Sender’s message, then he cannot be deceived. Deception is not
inevitable. The Sender always can play in a non-deceptive way. Although
deception is not possible in equilibrium in a perfect-information game, it
can arise in equilibrium if the Sender has information that is not available
to the Receiver. Even if the Receiver has accurate beliefs, he can be de-
ceived (according to my definition) if the Sender manipulates her superior
information to induce the Receiver to have inaccurate beliefs. In particular,
mixed-strategy equilibria of zero-sum games in which the Receiver observes
the action of a privately informed Sender are typically deceptive.
Although deception does not directly invoke the preferences of the play-
ers, economic analysis requires a discussion of the consequences of behavior.
Section 5 discusses the consequences of behavior from the perspective of the
Receiver. Hence it discusses what Austin would call perlocutionary acts. I
introduce the notion of damage. An action is damaging if the Sender has
another action available that induces the Receiver to make “better” deci-
sions. In Section 5.3, I make a connection between deception and damage,
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providing conditions under which deception must be damaging and damage
must be the result of deception.
Section 6 also discusses consequences, but now from the perspective of the
Sender. I consider bluffs, which are actions or messages that deceive in order
to benefit the Sender. I discuss the relationship between lies, deception, and
bluffs and identify situations is which bluffing arises.
Section 7 discusses five models from the literature that illustrate the main
ideas.
The Appendix contains proofs of results (when needed).
Lying and deception are common English words. The concepts discussed
in this paper are important for the study of strategic communication. I hope
that the names that I attach to these concepts are broadly consistent with
common usage.
2 A Basic Model
This section describes a basic framework. There are two agents, an informed
Sender, S, and an uninformed Receiver, R. Nature draws the state of the
world, θ, from a set Θ according to a distribution P . The Sender observes
θ, sends a message m ∈ M , and takes an action x ∈ X. The Receiver
observes m (but not x) and makes a decision y ∈ Y . U i(θ,m, x, y) is the
payoff that Player i receives given state θ ∈ Θ, message m ∈M , and actions
(x, y) ∈ X × Y . I assume that UR(·) does not depend directly on m.
Unless I say otherwise, assume that Θ, M , X, and Y are finite. P (θ) gives
the probability that the state is θ. P (·) is positive and satisfies ∑θ P (θ) = 1.
These strong assumptions lead to a restrictive model. Section 8 discusses
more general models.
Sometimes I study equilibrium behavior. An equilibrium is a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium: A configuration, (m∗, x∗, y∗, µ∗), where (m∗, x∗)
is a strategy for the Sender, y∗ is a strategy for the Receiver, and µ∗ is a
belief function that assigns to each m a probability distribution over Θ, such
that the Sender’s strategy is a best response to the Receiver’s strategy; the
Receiver’s strategy is a best response to the beliefs µ∗; and µ∗ is derived from
the Sender’s strategy using Bayes’s Rule whenever possible.1
1In this definition, m∗ is a function from types to messages; x∗ is a function from types
to Sender actions; and y∗ is a function from messages to Receiver decisions. Throughout
the paper I denote equilibrium strategies and beliefs with an asterisk.
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The definition of lying requires a comparison between the Sender’s mes-
sage m and the true state of the world θ. For each Θ0 ⊂ Θ, there exists a
message mΘ0 ∈ M and there is a common understanding that mΘ0 means
“θ ∈ Θ0.” Let mθ0 denote the message corresponding to the set {θ0}. To
simplify discussions, assume that there is exactly one way to describe each
subset.2 In particular, if Θ0 6= Θ′0, then mΘ0 6= mΘ′0 . When the message m
is equal to mΘ0 for some Θ0, I say that m has an accepted meaning. There
may be messages that have no accepted meaning. The purpose of including
messages that have accepted meanings is to make it possible to describe lies.
I do not require the Sender to use a message in the accepted manner or for
the Receiver to interpret it in the accepted way. It is possible that using
messages in a way that violates their accepted interpretation is costly.
Note the distinction between Sender messages and actions (m and x).
Formally they are different in two ways. First, the Receiver observes m,
but not x. This means that R’s strategy is a function of m and not x.
Second, UR(·) is independent of m.3 Consequently, S’s choice of x can have
a direct impact on R’s utility, but the choice of m does not.4 One setting
in which this formulation applies is a game in which S observes the state
of nature θ, chooses m as a function of θ, R hears m, and then S and
R play a simultaneous move game (in which S selects x and R selects y).
Section 7 contains other examples. I will refer to m as a message. When
I discuss lying, it is important that some messages have accepted meaning.
This interpretation is not necessary in the discussion of deception. I will try
to be clear when the analysis requires accepted meanings.
A special case of the model is a cheap-talk game in which X is empty
and neither US(·) nor UR(·) depend on m directly.5 Several times I illustrate
results using the special case of the cheap-talk model studied in Crawford and
Sobel [11]. In a CS cheap-talk game, Θ = Y = [0, 1]; for i = S,R, U i(θ, y)
is continuous, strictly concave in y, and satisfies U i12 > 0. A consequence of
these assumptions is that yi(θ) ≡ arg maxU i(θ, y) is well defined. CS cheap-
2In natural communication this assumption is not true. There are interesting questions
about what happens when there are two ways to communicate the same thing, but I do
not consider these issues in this paper.
3I permit US(·) to depend on m.
4The message m will typically have an indirect impact on R’s utility because it influ-
ences the choice of action, y.
5When discussing cheap-talk games, I suppress the irrelevant arguments (m and x) in
the description of U i(·).
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talk games also impose the property that yS(θ) > yR(θ) for all θ; and the
prior on states has a positive, continuous density. The game has a common
language if M consists of all Borel subsets of [0, 1] and the accepted meaning
of the message C is “θ is an element of C.”
Another special case of the model is a disclosure game (Grossman [18] and
Milgrom [27]) in which X is empty, UR(·) does not depend on m directly,
and
US(θ,m, y) =
{
uS(θ, y) if there exists Θ0 ⊂ Θ such that m = mΘ0 and θ ∈ Θ0
uS(θ, y)−K otherwise ,
where K is sufficiently large that the Sender of type θ would always select
a message of the form mΘ0 for a set Θ0 that contains m. This specification
captures the idea that the Sender can withhold information but cannot make
false claims.
This formal model is sufficient to describe the basic ideas and formulate
results, but it imposes strong assumptions. I discuss extensions in Section 8.
3 Lying
Section 3.1 defines lying. Section 3.2 discusses alternative definitions. Sec-
tion 3.3 discusses lies in cheap-talk games. Section 3.4 identifies a situation
in which honesty is compatible with equilibrium.
3.1 Lying: Definitions
I now present consistent definitions of lying that illustrate the subtleties
underlying the intuitive concept. There are more ambitious and systematic
attempts to present definitions of lying. I do not attempt to review this large
literature.6
Lying arises when the Sender says something that she believes to be false.
There are several possibilities.
6Mahon’s article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [26] carefully examines
the strengths and weaknesses of several possible definitions of lying. I share the reaction
of Morris [29] who writes that the Encyclopedia treatment might “make the overwhelmed
reader wonder whether lies and lying have any coherent meaning at all.” Morris, like me,
pursues the more modest goal of trying to clarify the definition of lying without exploring
many aspects important to philosophers.
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Definition 1 (Lying)
1. The message m is a lie given θ if m = mΘ0 and θ /∈ Θ0.
2. The message m is true given θ if m = mΘ0 and θ ∈ Θ0.
3. The message m is the whole truth given θ if m = mθ.
The definition of lying does not depend on the preferences of either player.
Whether a statement is a lie depends on the relationship between the state-
ment, the accepted meaning, and (what is believed to be) the truth. Ulti-
mately, preferences matter. Lies may benefit or hurt either player. It may be
intrinsically costly to lie and this cost may be linked to how the lie influences
the behavior of others. This section discusses the definition of lies. Subse-
quent sections discuss the consequences of lies and circumstances in which
lies will arise.
The use of the message mΘ0 when θ is the state and Θ0 contains both θ
and another state is not as precise as possible. Such a statement could be
called a “lie of omission,” but in this paper I will say it is true, but not the
whole truth.
The definition describes truth and lies in terms of the message sent. I
extend the definition to talk about strategies being honest or dishonest.
Definition 2 (Honest Strategies)
1. The strategy m∗ : Θ→M is honest if m∗(θ) is true for all θ.
2. The strategy m∗(·) is completely honest if m∗(θ) is the whole truth for
all θ.
3. The strategy m∗(·) is dishonest if there exists θ such that m∗(θ) is a lie.
Every message that has an accepted meaning is either a lie or is true.
The language may include messages that do not have an accepted meaning.
Messages that have no accepted meaning are neither lies nor true.
According to this definition, impossible statements (“I support you 1000%”)
are lies when they have meaning. More formally, what constitutes a lie may
depend on the specification of the state space. For example, suppose that θ
reflects the quality of something, for concreteness, let it describe the score
on an examination. It may be known that the score is a non-negative integer
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between 0 and 50 so that P (θ) = 0 for θ /∈ {0, 1, . . . , 50}. Is it a lie to report
a score of 51? It would be if 51 ∈ Θ, but not otherwise.
By concentrating on the Sender’s beliefs, the definition of lying ignores the
relationship between “objective truth” and the statement. This limitation
may be important when one tries to enforce laws that sanction lying. In
those situations, one would want to define truth in terms of an objective
standard rather than the Sender’s beliefs. The distinction only arises when
one permits the Sender to have statistically inaccurate beliefs.
The literature on strategic communication informally uses lying in a way
that it consistent with my definition. These papers often assume M = Θ
and view the commonly accepted meaning of a message as the message itself
(m = mθ). Theoretical papers consider perturbed versions of communication
games in which, with positive probability, the Sender is a behavioral type who
always reports honestly; or the Receiver is a behavioral type who interprets
messages literally (believing that the state is m after receiving the message
m); or perturbing preferences to include lying costs, which are defined in
terms of the difference between the true state and the message.7 Fischbacher
and Fo¨llmi-Heusi [15] and Gneezy [17] are examples of experimental papers
on communication that associate the message to the state and treat messages
as lies if they are not equal to the state.
3.2 Other Definitions
In this subsection I briefly discuss alternative definitions of lies and point out
empirical support for my definition.
St. Augustine [4, page 469] lists eight types of lies. He focuses on con-
sequences when he discusses the morality of lying and, in particular, tries
to determine whether it is ever acceptable to tell a lie.8 I agree that con-
sequences are important, but it is useful to have a taxonomy that evaluates
the veracity of statements without investigating the interpretation of the
statements.
7Chen [6] studies cheap-talk models with behavioral types. Kartik [21] studies models
with costly lies.
8Augustine appears to say that it is never right to lie, but he is also flexible: dishonest
statements said in jest would not constitute a lie according to his definition, but would be
lies according to my taxonomy. Under my definition, ironic statements are typically lies.
Presumably, Augustine would not view these statements as lies.
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Other philosophers follow St. Augustine’s tradition and include conse-
quences in their definition of lying. In an article intended for a general
audience, Lynch [24] writes “to lie is to deliberately say what you believe
to be false with the intention of deceiving your audience.” Frankfurt [16]
appears to use the term in a similar way. Unlike my definition, this defi-
nition demands that the Sender have beliefs about how the Receiver reacts
to communication. My use of the term permits lies even without reference
to beliefs about others. Consequences are important and require attention.
I find it valuable to separate this discussion and discuss the implications of
communication on welfare in Sections 5 and 6.
Coleman and Kay [8] argue that one evaluates whether a statement is a
lie by assessing the extent to which it satisfies three criteria:
1. the statement is false
2. the speaker believes the statement to be false
3. the intention of the speaker is to deceive
These three criteria separate statements into eight possible categories
(ranging from a true statement that is known to be true that is uttered
with no intention to deceive to a false statement that is known to be false
that is uttered with intention to deceive). Coleman and Kay construct eight
stories, one for each category, and ask subjects to rate them.9 They find
that each of the criteria contribute to whether a statement is classified as
a lie, but the second criterion – whether the speaker believes the statement
to be true – is the most important characteristic in the sense that the four
stories most frequently classified as lies were the ones in which the speaker
believes the statement to be false. This suggests that my taxonomy captures
an important aspect of lying. It is consistent with the spirit of my definitions
to include items from the first category (which would be the same as the
second category when the Sender’s beliefs are correct). Intentions, however,
do not play a role in my definition. In order to be a lie in the sense of
Frankfurt and Lynch a statement must satisfy criteria two and three.
9Subjects reported whether they thought the statement was a lie and how confident
they were that others would agree.
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3.3 Lies in Cheap-Talk Games
This subsection investigates lying in cheap-talk games with a common lan-
guage.
The following properties are simple consequences of facts about equilibria
of cheap-talk games.
Remark 1 In a cheap-talk game with a common language, there always exist
equilibria involving lies.
When talk is cheap, the existence of a common language does not mean
that rational agents will use the language in the conventional way in equi-
librium. Remark 1 notes this. Cheap-talk games always have a babbling
equilibrium in which all Senders send the same message with probability one
and the Receiver’s response does not depend on the message. In equilibrium,
if Senders use a message that has an accepted meaning of the form “the state
is θ0,” all but one type of Sender tells a lie.
An equilibrium is non-trivial if the Receiver takes more than one action
with positive probability in equilibrium. When an equilibrium is non-trivial,
it is possible to relabel messages so that every Sender type is lying. To
establish this result, I use the following observation.
Lemma 1 If (m∗, y∗, µ∗) is an equilibrium of a cheap-talk game, and pi :
M →M is a bijection, then (m˜∗, y˜∗, µ˜∗) is also an equilibrium where m˜∗(θ) =
pi(m∗(θ)), y˜∗(pi(m)) ≡ y∗(m), and µ˜∗(· | n) = µ∗(· | pi−1(n)).
Lemma 1 states that the interpretation of messages is arbitrary in an
equilibrium of a cheap-talk game. Given an equilibrium, one obtains another
equilibrium by relabeling the messages and modifying the action rule so that
it respects the relabeling. It is straightforward to verify that (m˜∗, y˜∗, µ˜∗) is
an equilibrium if and only if (m∗, y∗, µ∗) is an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 In a cheap-talk game with a common language, any non-
trivial equilibrium type-action distribution10 can be generated by an equilib-
rium in which the Sender’s strategy is dishonest.
10Let σ be a mixed strategy for S and α a mixed strategy for R. The type-action
distribution generated by a mixed-strategy profile (σ, α) is a probability distribution over
(θ, y) pairs where α(y | m)σ(m | θ) is the density of (θ, y).
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If all messages are the whole truth, then the equilibrium must be fully
separating (each type θ sends the message mθ). Hence when separating
equilibria do not exist, some agents fail to tell the whole truth.
Remark 2 In every equilibrium of a CS cheap-talk game, there is a positive
probability that the Sender does not tell the whole truth.
Remark 2 is not true for all cheap-talk games. In particular, it is not true
when the Sender and Receiver have identical preferences. In CS cheap talk
games fully revealing equilibrium do not exist and hence complete honesty
in not possible.
Remark 3 In a CS cheap-talk game with a common language, every equi-
librium type-action distribution can be supported as an equilibrium in which
the Sender tells the truth.
Remark 3 states that any equilibrium can be interpreted as one in which
the Sender reports honestly, but incompletely. This corresponds to a stan-
dard interpretation of the partition equilibria of cheap-talk games. In any
equilibrium, one uses Lemma 1 to relabel messages so that types in the
interval [θi, θi+1] report “my type is [θi, θi+1].” Remark 3 holds for any pure-
strategy equilibrium of a cheap-talk game. The result holds for general cheap-
talk games provided that the common language is large enough to include
descriptions of all probability distributions over types.11
There is a tension between Remark 1 and Remark 3 because Remark 1
states that lying may be a part of equilibrium while Remark 3 states that
lying need not be a part of equilibrium. The tension arises because cheap-
talk games have multiple equilibria. The existence of a common language is
not sufficient to guarantee that agents coordinate on the common language
when they play a game. Coordination requires three things: that agents
have common beliefs about the mapping between language and states (with
follows from the existence of a common language); that agents have accurate
expectations about the strategy choices of their opponent (which follows from
the assumption of equilibrium); and that agents actually use messages in the
commonly accepted way (which is consistent with the first two conditions,
but not implied by the first two conditions, in cheap-talk games).
The next example is an illustration.
11When types are not continuously distributed, equilibrium behavior could involve the
sender using mixed strategies. In this situation one needs the entire strategy of the Sender
to compute the posterior distribution of θ given m.
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Example 1 (Lies in a Cheap-Talk Game) Consider a binary cheap-talk
game with two messages (A and B), two states (0 and 1), and two actions,
and an equilibrium in which the Sender always sends B when θ = 1 and
randomizes between A and B when θ = 0. It is straightforward to identify
preferences under which such an equilibrium exists. Suppose that the accepted
meaning of A is “the state is 0” and the accepted meaning of B is “the state
is 1.” In equilibrium the Sender lies (with positive probability) when θ = 0.
Some refinement arguments not only select type-action distributions, but
make restrictions on the relationship between messages and actions in equi-
librium. These restrictions may not be consistent with the accepted meaning
of words. For example, Kartik and Sobel [23] study a CS cheap-talk game in
which M is linearly ordered and in which players are restricted to monotonic
strategies.12 The monotonicity restriction does not eliminate any equilibrium
type-action distributions. Nevertheless, Kartik and Sobel [23] show the only
equilibrium that survives iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies
uses the highest N∗ messages (where N∗ is the maximum number of actions
induced in any equilibrium). If messages are identified with types in the
standard way, agents are systematically dishonest in this outcome: They use
messages that exaggerate their type. The existence of an order on message
does provide structure on the way that players use and interpret messages
in equilibrium. In equilibrium, no one is fooled, but for strategic reasons, no
agent reports honestly.
Although it is generally possible for there to be lying in equilibrium of
cheap-talk games with a common language, the ability to lie is damaging to
both players in the sense that the Receiver always prefers the Sender to tell
the whole truth and, ex ante (at least for the class of CS cheap-talk games
satisfying a monotonicity condition studied in Crawford and Sobel [11]), the
Sender obtains a higher expected payoff when the Receiver is fully informed
than in any equilibrium.
3.4 Completely Honest Equilibria
In this subsection I go beyond cheap-talk games and investigate the possibil-
ity of completely honest behavior in equilibrium. On one hand, if messages
12Monotonicity means that if θ′ > θ, then the Sender must send a weakly higher message
and if m′ > m, then the Receiver must take a weakly higher action.
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are costly, there is no reason to expect agents to be honest. A blunt exam-
ple is a situation in which there are two states and two messages and that
it is extremely costly for the Sender to use mθ (the message with accepted
meaning θ) when the state is θ. On the other hand, if there is no conflict of
interest between the players, there is no strategic reason that rules out the
possibility that the Sender will report the complete truth in equilibrium.
Given θ, let yR(θ,m, x) solve maxUR(θ, y,m, x) and let (m(θ), x(θ)) solve:
max
m,x
US(θ,m, x, yR(θ,m, x)). (1)
Hence (m(θ), x(θ)) is the set of messages that maximize S’s utility assuming
that the message is revealing and R responds with his optimal action. As-
suming that (1) has a unique solution, it is immediate that an equilibrium in
which the Sender tells the whole truth exists only if m(θ) 6= m(θ′) whenever
θ 6= θ′.13 When m(·) is single valued and one-to-one, the game is potentially
revealing. It is straightforward to provide conditions on U i(·) under which
a game is potentially revealing.14
The next result is an immediate consequence.
Remark 4 In any potentially revealing game, there exists a specification of
language under which there exists an equilibrium in which the Sender tells
the whole truth with probability one.
Remark 4 gives strong conditions under which honesty is compatible with
strategic behavior. In a potentially revealing game with common interests,15
an honest equilibrium exists if the meaning of m(θ) is “my type is θ.” Since
m(θ) is determined exclusively from the game while the meaning of the mes-
sage m(θ) may come from external considerations, it is not necessary that an
honest equilibrium will exist even in potentially revealing common-interest
games.
Remark 4 requires the common language be defined in terms of the equi-
librium (rather than being specified exogenously). This observation makes
13If the solution to (1) is not unique, then the necessary condition is that there exists a
selection from the solution correspondence that is one to one.
14For example, if y,m, θ are all elements of the unit interval, X is empty, UR(θ,m, y) =
−(y − θ)2, US(θ,m, y) = f(y) + g(y, θ) for differentiable f and twice differentiable g, and
g12(·) > 0, then the condition holds.
15A communication game has common interests if US(θ,m, x, y) = UR(θ,m, y) for all
x, y, and m; in particular, US(·) is independent of x.
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the underlying idea behind the existence of truthful equilibria transparent:
There exists an equilibrium in which the Sender tells the whole truth with
probability one if and only if the game has a separating equilibrium. In
general, when language is specified independent of the strategic situation,
lying may arise in a separating equilibrium. This would happen, as I dis-
cuss in Section 7, if in equilibrium the Sender exaggerates, but the Receiver
accurately takes the possibility for exaggeration into account.
If the language contains a word for each subset of Θ,16 there is a spec-
ification of language in which the Sender tells the truth. The specification
of language depends on the equilibrium strategies. That is, is conclusion
requires that language be defined relative to the equilibrium. If the language
is specified independent of the payoffs (which seems natural), then there is
no guarantee that there exists an equilibrium in which the Sender tells the
whole truth with probability one.
Equilibria in which the Sender tells the whole truth with probability one
need not be efficient (even when S and R have identical preferences). Effi-
cient equilibria need not be honest. In order to create a connection between
honesty and efficiency, a reasonable approach would be to assume that lying
is costly.
4 Deception
The definition of lying depends only on the existence of accepted meanings
of words. It makes no reference to how S’s statements might influence R.
To describe these features, I need to investigate how S’s behavior influences
R’s beliefs. This section studies properties of beliefs. Section 4.1 provides
definitions of central concepts: accuracy and deception. Section 4.2 identifies
significant properties of deception. Section 4.3 discusses deception in cheap-
talk games. Section 4.4 compares lying and deception.
4.1 Accuracy and Deception
Assume that each m induces a posterior distribution µ(θ | m), where µ(· | m)
is the posterior belief of the Receiver given the message m. In the last two
parts of the definition, R forms beliefs by taking into account the Sender’s
16For a mixed strategy equilibrium, it suffices to have a word for each probability dis-
tribution over Θ.
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mixed strategy, σ(·); σ(m | θ) is the probability that the Sender with type θ
sends the message m. Hence, σ(m | θ) ≥ 0 and ∑m∈M σ(m | θ) = 1 for all θ.
Definition 3 (Properties of Beliefs)
1. The belief µ(· | m) is completely inaccurate given θ if
µ(θ | m) = 0.
2. The belief µ(· | m) is inaccurate given θ if µ(θ | m) ∈ [0, 1).
3. The belief µ(· | m) is accurate given θ if µ(θ | m) = 1.
4. The belief µ(· | m) is rational given θ, and σ(·) if
µ(θ | m) = σ(m | θ)P (θ)∑
θ′ σ(m | θ′)P (θ′)
(2)
whenever ∑
θ′
σ(m | θ′)P (θ′) > 0. (3)
5. The belief µ(·) is rational given σ(·) if equation (2) holds for all m
and θ whenever inequality (3) holds.
Beliefs are accurate if they reflect the Sender’s information and inaccurate
otherwise. Completely inaccurate beliefs place zero probability on the true
state. Rational beliefs (which are called consistent beliefs in some contexts)
are statistically correct given the description of the game (the prior P and
the information) and the Sender’s strategy.
In a strategic setting, the Receiver’s beliefs are derived from the descrip-
tion of the game (in particular, the prior distribution) and the Sender’s be-
havior. In equilibrium, the Receiver accurately processes information in the
Sender’s strategy. At this point, I do not want to restrict the Receiver to
equilibrium behavior. In fact, one can relate properties of beliefs to lying if
the Receiver believes everything he hears. I maintain the assumption that
the game has a language in which for each subset of states Θ0 ⊂ Θ there
exists mΘ0 ∈M that has the meaning “θ ∈ Θ0.”
Informally, deception is a deliberate attempt by the Sender to induce
incorrect beliefs. The notions of inaccurate beliefs are poorly suited for dis-
cussing deception because they would lead to calling too many things or too
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few things deception. On one hand, unless the Receiver is extremely naive
or uses a misspecified model, his beliefs will not be completely inaccurate.
That is, the Sender would rarely have the opportunity to induce completely
inaccurate beliefs and a definition of deception based on this idea would be
too narrow. On the other hand, in interesting settings, beliefs are inaccurate.
Classifying any message that leads to inaccurate beliefs as deceptive is likely
to be too broad. Consequently, I propose another way in which beliefs can
be incorrect.
In the following definition, I(· | θ) is the probability distribution that
places probability one on θ. That is,
I(θ′ | θ) =
{
0 if θ′ 6= θ
1 if θ′ = θ.
.
Definition 4 (Deception) Let µ be a probability distribution on Θ.
1. The message m is deceptive given θ and µ if there exists a message
n such that µ(θ | n) > 0 and a number p ∈ [0, 1), and a distribution ρ
satisfying ρ(θ) = 0 such that
µ(· | m) = pµ(· | n) + (1− p)ρ (4)
2. The message m is strongly deceptive given θ and µ if there exists n
such that µ(· | m) 6= µ(· | n) and p ∈ [0, 1) such that
µ(· | n) = pµ(· | m) + (1− p)I(· | θ). (5)
The message m is deceptive if there is another message n that leads to
different beliefs and the beliefs induced by m are “further from the truth” in
the sense that the beliefs induced by m are a mixture of the beliefs given n
and some completely inaccurate beliefs. It is immediate that if m is accurate,
then it cannot be deceptive and if m is completely inaccurate, then it must
be deceptive provided that there is some message n that is not completely
inaccurate given θ. The restriction that µ(θ | n) > 0 rules out a trivial
case. If there were no such message, then it is impossible to convince the
Receiver that θ is possible and the Receiver will have completely inaccurate
beliefs independent of the Sender’s message. I do not wish to classify any
message as deceptive in this case. Notice that if m is deceptive given θ and
µ, µ(· | m) 6= µ(· | n) because p 6= 1 in (4) and µ(θ | n) > 0.
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The definition permits two kinds of deception that do not have adverse
consequences for others. The framework allows the possibility of self decep-
tion. In such a situation I interpret the Receiver not as a second player, but
as a future version of the Sender. Why would the Sender want to deceive
herself? Incentives for self deception may arise when the present and future
version of the Sender have different preferences (as in dual self models or
when there is time inconsistency). Also, there are situations in which S in-
duces inaccurate beliefs in a way that benefits the Receiver. The Sender’s
behavior could “protect” the Receiver from painful information (perhaps this
happens when a doctor refuses to reveal details of a diagnosis of a terminal
illness) or out of paternalism (the Sender deceives the Receiver in order to
prevent the Receiver from taking a self destructive action).
Merely having inaccurate beliefs is not necessarily a sign of deception.
Suppose for example that µ(· | m) does not depend on m. In this case, S’s
message does not influence R’s beliefs.17 Consequently although R’s beliefs
may be inaccurate, S is not responsible for the inaccuracy. Hence a necessary
condition for deception is that R responds differently to different messages.
Two related aspects of the definition deserve comment. First, deception
does not give a privileged position to the prior distribution. That is, one
evaluates whether a message is deceptive by comparing the beliefs it induces
to beliefs that could have been induced with an alternative message. Second,
even when there is a message that corresponds to “silence,” the definition
is agnostic about whether this message is deceptive. I can include these
features in the model if I assume that there is a distinguished message m˜
that is interpreted as silence and I assume that the Receiver does not update
given silence (µ(· | m˜) = P (·)). Under these assumptions, Definition 4 would
say that m is deceptive given θ if µ(· | m) is further from θ than the prior
and silence (m˜) is deceptive if the Sender could induce beliefs that are closer
to the true state than the prior. Of course, in general, µ(· | m˜) 6= P (·).
The next result provides an alternative characterization of deception.
Proposition 2 The message m is deceptive given θ and µ if and only if
there exists a message n such that µ(θ | n) > 0 and µ(· | m) 6= µ(· | n), such
that
µ(θ | m)/µ(θ | n) = min
θ′∈Θ,µ(θ′|n)6=0
µ(θ′ | m)/µ(θ′ | n). (6)
17It is possible that S’s message influences R’s action, but if R responds optimally to
beliefs, the message will not influence R’s utility.
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Proposition 2 is a direct consequence of (4). It states that a message m is
deceptive if there is another message n such that the probability of the true
state relative to any other state is smaller under beliefs induced by m than
by beliefs induced by n, that is
µ(θ | m)
µ(θ′ | m) <
µ(θ | n)
µ(θ′ | n) .
A message m is strongly deceptive if there is an alternative message that
leads the Receiver to have beliefs that are closer to what the Sender believes.
In the definition, “closer” means on a segment connecting S’s beliefs to the
beliefs induced by m. In general, this definition is quite restrictive. When
there are two states, the set of possible beliefs is one dimensional and if m
and n induce different beliefs, then one of the beliefs will be closer to S’s
beliefs than the other. When there are more states, however, it is unlikely
for three beliefs to be co-linear. So strongly deceptive beliefs are unusual.
Any strongly deceptive message is deceptive. Conversely, deceptive messages
are strongly deceptive when there are only two states. In general, there exist
deceptive messages that are not strongly deceptive.
Example 2 (Strongly Deceptive Messages) Consider a binary model like
Example 1 (talk need not be cheap). Assume that the Sender uses message
B whenever θ = 1 and both messages A and B with positive probability when
θ = 0. In this case, the rational Receiver has accurate beliefs when he hears A
and inaccurate beliefs when he hears B. The message B is strongly deceptive
given θ = 0 and equilibrium beliefs.
The definition of deceptive messages leads to a natural definition of de-
ceptive strategies.
Definition 5 (Deceptive Strategies) Let µ be a probability distribution
on Θ.
1. The strategy m∗ : Θ → M is deceptive given µ if there exists θ such
that m∗(θ) is deceptive given θ and µ.
2. The strategy m∗ : Θ→M is strongly deceptive given µ if there exists θ
such that m∗(θ) is strongly deceptive given θ and µ.
I postpone a discussion of alternative definitions until Section 5.4.
17
4.2 Properties of Deception
This section describes properties of deception.
Proposition 3 If the set of messages is finite, for any µ the Sender will
have a strategy that is not deceptive given µ.
Proposition 3 notes that it is always possible for the Sender to avoid
deception.18
Remark 5 If µ(· | m) is independent of m, then no strategy of the Sender
is deceptive given µ.
In particular, Remark 5 implies that there is no deception in a pooling
equilibrium when the Receiver responds to off-the-path messages with the
same equilibrium action. Remark 5 is a trivial consequence of the definition
of deception, but it is an important observation. Proposition 3 and Remark 5
guarantees that deception is not inevitable for two reasons. First, it is always
possible for the Sender to avoid deceiving the Receiver. Second, if the Re-
ceiver ignores the Sender, then he cannot be deceived. I view these properties
as essential for any notion of deception.
There is another familiar context in which there is no deception in equi-
librium.
Remark 6 If (m∗, x∗, y∗, µ∗) is a separating equilibrium, then m∗ is not de-
ceptive given µ∗.
Remark 6 follows because the Sender always induces accurate beliefs.
Remarks 5 and 6 apply to communication games in general.
Since deception requires the Sender’s message to (sometimes) influence
the Receiver’s beliefs, cheap-talk games always have a non-deceptive equi-
librium: Remark 5 implies that there is no deception in a babbling equilib-
rium.19
It is tempting to conjecture that deception is not possible in equilibrium.
The truth of the conjecture depends, of course, upon the definition of decep-
tion. If one equates deception to inducing non-rational beliefs, then deception
18This result also holds under mild regularity continuous in continuous models.
19In a babbling equilibrium, the Receiver takes the same action independent of the
Sender’s message.
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is inconsistent with equilibrium. My definition is different. Deception as I
have defined it is consistent with equilibrium. I illustrate this possibility
with a simple example and then, in the next subsection, I discuss deception
in cheap-talk games.
Example 3 (Deception in a Disclosure Game) It is deceptive to par-
tially reveal the truth in a disclosure game when full disclosure is feasible.
Such an outcome can be the only equilibrium in some situations (when it is
not common knowledge that the Sender is informed, for example).
Deception is also possible in equilibrium when revealing the truth is fea-
sible and credible, but costly to the Sender, for example in a pooling equi-
librium of a labor-market signaling game in which the Sender has a message
that would reveal her to have the highest ability, but the highest-type Sender
prefers to pool.
4.3 Deception in Cheap-Talk Games
In Section 3.3 I used cheap-talk games to illustrate properties of lying. In
this subsection I discuss deception in cheap-talk games. Recall that m must
be linked to accepted meaning to discuss lying, but no such association is
necessary for deception.
The first example shows that the conclusion of Example 3 holds in cheap
talk games.
Example 4 (Deception in Cheap-Talk Games) Consider the binary cheap-
talk game of Example 1. It is strongly deceptive given θ = 0 to send the mes-
sage B in an equilibrium in which the Sender always sends B when θ = 1
and randomizes between A and B when θ = 0.
Related results are possible in the cheap-talk games studied in Crawford
and Sobel [11] and in the richer environment of Morgan and Stocken [28].
Morgan and Stocken study a cheap-talk model in which the Receiver is un-
certain about a payoff relevant state and about the preferences of the Sender
– some Sender types are unbiased and have the same preferences as the Re-
ceiver, while others have an upward bias. In this way it is a mixture of a
pure-coordination game and a CS game. Equilibrium type-action distribu-
tions have the same qualitative features of the equilibria in CS (in particular,
only a finite number of actions are induced). The existence of biased agents
19
makes the messages of the unbiased agents more credible in equilibrium, in-
creasing opportunities to deceive in equilibrium relative to a model with only
biased types.
Proposition 4 Any equilibrium type-action distribution in the CS model can
be generated by an equilibrium (m∗, y∗, µ∗) such that for each θ, m∗(θ) is not
deceptive given θ and y∗.
Proposition 4 states that deception is not necessary in equilibrium of a
cheap-talk game. It follows because one can generate any equilibrium type-
action distribution by beliefs that interpret all messages as on-path messages
and in this situation, no message can provide more accurate information
about the true state than the equilibrium message. There are at least two
ways in which deception is possible in the CS model. One can imagine an
equilibrium in which different beliefs induce the same action. For example,
imagine a pooling equilibrium in which all Senders send the message m0; the
Receiver’s beliefs given m0 equal the prior; the Receiver’s action given m0
(best response to prior) is y0; and that given any m 6= m0, R believes that
θ = θˆ, where R’s best response to θˆ is y0.
20 In this case, it is deceptive
for θ = θˆ to send the message m0, but the deception has no consequence
because it does not change R’s behavior. A more interesting kind of deception
is possible. It is known (Chen, Kartik, Sobel [7]) that there always exists
an equilibrium (m∗, y∗) in which US(0, y∗(m∗(0))) > US(0, y¯(0)). In this
case, there exists an equilibrium in which R responds to off-path messages
with the belief that θ = 0 and the action y¯(0). In this case, it is strongly
deceptive for θ = 0 to send m∗(0) instead of an off-path message. Typically
one can construct off-path beliefs that pool together all types below a (small)
critical type θˆ. In this case, it is deceptive for all types less than θˆ to follow
the equilibrium. This kind of deception – the possibility of supporting an
equilibrium with an off-path action that is strictly lower than all of the on-
path actions – is only possible for equilibrium outcomes that satisfy the no-
incentive-to-separate condition. Chen, Kartik, and Sobel use this condition
as a selection criteria. That is, the argument selects exactly the equilibria
that permit deception that influences payoffs.
20If the prior is uniform and UR(θ, y) = −(y − θ)2, then y0 = θˆ = .5.
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4.4 Deception and Lying
This section points out connections between lying and deception.
There is no reason why lies must be deceptive. The Receiver may antici-
pate a lie and form accurate beliefs after hearing one. If sellers make inflated
claims about the quality of a product (or letters of recommendation overstate
the abilities of a job candidate) and these claims are fully anticipated and
discounted, then the claims are lies but not deceptive. This form of lying is
sometimes called “puffery.”
There is no reason why honesty must induce accurate beliefs. The Re-
ceiver may draw inaccurate inferences from an honest statement.21
Definition 6 In a communication game, the Receiver is credulous if µ(· |
mΘ0) is equal to the posterior distribution conditional on θ ∈ Θ0. That is
µ(θ | mΘ0) =
{
0 if θ /∈ Θ0
P (θ)∑
θ′∈Θ0 P (θ
′) if θ ∈ Θ0.
If the Receiver is credulous, there is a natural connection between lying
and inaccurate beliefs.
Remark 7 Given a communication game,
1. if m is a lie given θ and R is credulous, then µ(· | m) is completely
inaccurate given m and θ.
2. if m is true, but not the whole truth, given θ and R is credulous, then
µ(· | m) is inaccurate given m and θ.
3. if m is the whole truth given θ and R is credulous, then µ(· | m) is
accurate given m and θ.
Remark 7 follows immediately from the definitions.
Remark 7 connects beliefs to lies when the Receiver is credulous. Alter-
natively, we can relate the concepts when the Sender is completely truthful
and therefore uses the strategy
σ(m | θ) =
{
1 if m = mθ
0 if m 6= mθ
.
21There are interesting situations in which honest statements may be deceptive. Rogers,
Zeckhauser, Gino, Norton, and Schweitzer [30] call the strategy of using truthful state-
ments to deceive “paltering” and provide natural and laboratory examples.
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Remark 8 Given a communication game with a common language, if S tells
the whole truth and R is rational, then the Receiver’s beliefs are accurate.
Similarly, the Receiver will have inaccurate (but not totally inaccurate)
beliefs if the Sender tells the truth but not the whole truth.
5 Damage
I discussed lies without introducing the interpretation of messages. Hence
I classified lies as locutionary acts. Deception requires making assumptions
about how the Receiver interprets messages, but my development made no
assumptions about the consequences of deception. Hence deception is a il-
locutionary act. In this section, I discuss perlocutionary aspects of commu-
nication. By studying the consequences of communication, I must take into
account how the Sender’s behavior influences the Receiver’s utility.
Section 5.1 defines a damaging message as one that lowers the Receiver’s
payoff. Section 5.2 discusses the properties of damaging messages. Sec-
tion 5.3 identifies connections between damaging and deceptive messages.
This subsection connects the idea of inaccurate beliefs introduced in Sec-
tion 4.1 to damaging behavior. In particular, it identifies the way in which
deceptive (and strongly deceptive) messages are damaging and conversely,
demonstrates a sense in which damaging messages must be deceptive. Sec-
tion 5.4 discusses alternative definitions of deception and damage.
5.1 Definition of Damage
The utility the Sender believes the Receiver will get depends on the Sender’s
behavior, the action the Receiver takes,22 and the state. Let y∗(m) be the
Receiver’s response to the message m. Let u¯R(θ, x,m) = UR(θ, x, y∗(m))
be the Receiver’s expected utility when S takes action x, sends the message
m, and the true state is θ. Interpret this as the Sender’s evaluation of the
Receiver’s payoff. Observe that y∗(m) need not maximize UR(θ, x, y) even in
equilibrium, because when R hears m he may not know what the true state
is.
22More precisely, the action the Sender believes that the Receiver takes.
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Definition 7 (Damaging Behavior) 1. The pair (m,x) is damaging
given θ and y(·) if there exists a message n such that u¯R(θ, x, y(m)) <
u¯R(θ, x, y(n)).
2. The strategy (m∗, x∗) is a damaging strategy given y(·) if there exists
a θ such that (m∗(θ), x∗(θ)) is a damaging given θ and y(·).
Definition 7 makes no reference to a common language.
The Sender’s action choice x does not appear in the definition of lying
because x is not evaluated relative to accepted meaning. The Sender’s action
choice does not appear in the definition of deception because the Receiver
does not observe x and so his beliefs are independent of x.
It is important that m does not enter into the Receiver’s preferences
because in many strategic situations the Sender may take actions that harm
the Receiver, but the damage is not the result of any attempt to deceive. For
example, in a dictator game, any time the dictator takes a positive share of
surplus for herself, there is an alternative action that would be strictly better
for the other player. One reason for maintaining the distinction between x
and m is because there are many natural situations in which Sender’s actions
directly influence the Receiver’s utility. I reserve the term damage to describe
harm caused to the Receiver by the Sender’s choice of message.
5.2 Properties of Damaging Messages
The following observations are immediate and parallel results about decep-
tion (Proposition 3, Remark 5, and Remark 6).
Proposition 5 If the Sender’s strategy set is finite, then for each θ and y(·),
the Sender will have a strategy that is not damaging.
Remark 9 If y(·) is constant, then no Sender strategy is damaging given
y(·).
Remark 9 asserts that the Sender cannot send a damaging message if the
Receiver’s actions are independent of the message received
Remark 10 If (m∗, x∗, y∗, µ∗) is a separating equilibrium, then m∗ is not
damaging given y∗.
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Damaging messages are consistent with equilibrium. Take an equilibrium
in a CS cheap-talk game in which more than one action is induced and the
Sender has a uniformly positive bias (with full information, the Sender’s
utility maximizing action is strictly greater than the Receiver’s). When the
Sender is indifferent between sending messages that induce distinct actions,
a and a′ > a, the Receiver strictly prefers action a. Hence when the Sender’s
type θ is slightly greater than the type indifferent between a and a′, the
Receiver would strictly prefer the Sender to send the message that induces
a than type θ’s equilibrium message (that induces a′). In this situation,
a rational Receiver is not deceived “on average,” but given the Receiver’s
strategy there are realizations of the state after which the Sender causes the
Receiver to take an inferior decision. If beliefs are rational, R is fully aware
that he will be deceived in this way, but short of switching to the babbling
equilibrium, there is nothing he can do about it. Hence it is possible for
the Sender to send damaging messages in informative equilibria of cheap-
talk games. Since the Receiver ex ante prefers informative equilibria to the
babbling equilibrium, this means that allowing damaging messages can be
beneficial to the Receiver.
5.3 Damage and Deception
This section describes the connections between damaging and deceptive mes-
sages. Because in general S’s action choice can directly harm R, I assume
that X is empty and focus on how deceptive behavior, rather that payoff-
relevant actions, may have negative consequences for R. I first relate damage
to deception; next I relate damage to strong deception; finally I talk about
the possibility for deception in common-interest games.
For the first result, I assume that the Receiver’s preferences belong to a
restrictive class.
Definition 8 The Receiver’s preferences are state specific if there is a bijec-
tion υ : Θ→ Y and positive numbers α(θ) for θ ∈ Θ such that
UR(θ, y) =
{
α(θ) if y = υ(θ)
0 if y 6= υ(θ)
If the Receiver has state-specific preferences, then he has a unique action
(υ(θ)) that is a best response when the state is θ. If the Receiver takes an
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action that does not match the best action for the state, he receives payoff
zero.
Let BR(µ) denote R’s best response correspondence. That is, BR(µ) =
arg maxy∈Y
∑
θ′∈Θ U
R(θ′, y)µ(θ′).
Proposition 6 Assume that R has state-specific preferences. If m is decep-
tive given θ and µ, then there exists n such that
max
y∈BR(µ(·|n))
UR(θ, y) ≥ max
y′∈BR(µ(·|m))
UR(θ, y′). (7)
If R has at least two actions, and m is not deceptive given µ, then there
exists a specification of state-specific preferences of R such that
min
y∈BR(µ(·|m))
UR(θ, y) > max
y′∈BR(µ(·|n))
UR(θ, y′) (8)
for all n 6= m.
Proposition 6 states on one hand that if m is deceptive given θ, then any
Receiver with state-specific preferences would do at least as well if he heard
message n instead of m. On the other hand, if m is not deceptive given θ,
then there exists a specification of state-specific preferences for which the
message m is not damaging given θ (assuming R responds optimally). The
two parts of the proposition are not symmetric when R has multiple best
replies. It is possible that R is indifferent between two actions at µ(· | m)
and µ(· | n) but that these actions yield different utilities given θ.
The proof of Proposition 6 is a straightforward consequence of the char-
acterization result in Proposition 2.
Given µ(· | m) 6= I(· | θ) there is a full dimensional set of beliefs µ(· | n)
that satisfy equation (4). This suggests that the definition permits “too
much” deception. Proposition 6 suggests a context under which the defini-
tion might be appropriate. If the problem has enough structure so that R’s
preferences are known to be state specific, then there is a clear connection
between deception and damage.
What if R’s preferences need not be state specific? The notion of strong
deception provides a result that parallels Proposition 6 when R’s preferences
are not restricted. To state the result, I need two preliminary observations.
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Suppose that S receives the signal θ and can induce beliefs of the form
pI(· | θ) + (1− p)γ, where γ is an arbitrary distribution over states. Let y¯(p)
be a Receiver-optimal response to these beliefs. I claim that R’s expected
utility is an increasing function of p.
Lemma 2 UR(θ, y¯(p)) is increasing in p. If p′ > p and y¯(p′) is not a best
response to pµS(θ) + (1− p)γ, then UR(θ, y(p′)) > UR(θ, y¯(p)).
Lemma 3 If R has at least two actions, and γ′ cannot be written as a convex
combination of µS(θ) and γ, then there exists a specification of preferences
for the Receiver such that UR(θ, y¯(γ′)) > UR(θ, y¯(γ)).
The next result is a consequence of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3. It connects
strongly deceptive messages to damaging messages. The result is awkward
to state if R’s best reply to µ(· | m) is also a best reply to µ(· | n). I view this
as a technicality, which I rule out by assumption. For the next results call a
message m influentially deceptive given θ and µ if equation (5) holds and
no element of BR(µ(· | m)) is an element of BR(µ(· | n)).
Proposition 7 If m is influentially deceptive given θ and µ, then it is dam-
aging given θ assuming that R responds optimally to beliefs. If a message is
damaging given θ and R’s best reply to beliefs for every specification of R’s
preferences, then it is influentially deceptive.
The next result is essentially a restatement of the first part of Proposi-
tion 7.
Proposition 8 If Receiver is credulous and all dishonest messages are in-
fluentially deceptive, then any lie is damaging.
If R is credulous, then he believes what the Sender says. If m is influen-
tially deceptive, then it leads to a payoff for R that is strictly less than what
R would have received given an honest message by Proposition 7. Hence any
lie must be damaging.
I conclude this subsection by observing that the Receiver cannot lose from
deception in a game with common interests. That is, if there is a message
m that is deceptive (relative to some state and equilibrium beliefs), then R’s
equilibrium payoff given m is no larger than his payoff given a non-deceptive
message. The result does not rule out deception in common-interest games,
but it implies that if there is deception, then the deception will not influence
payoffs.
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Proposition 9 Let (m∗, y∗, µ∗) be an equilibrium of a common-interest com-
munication game, m∗ is not damaging given y∗.
5.4 Discussion
This section discusses alternative definitions of deception. I postponed the
discussion until I introduced damaging messages because some of the alter-
natives incorporate damage into the definition.
Definition 4 associates deception with inducing beliefs that are “further
from the truth” and offers two ways to think about what it means for one
belief to be further from the truth than another. But there are many other
ways to compare beliefs, so there are many possible ways in which one might
talk about deception. The results of Section 5.3 suggest that one can intro-
duce a family of definitions of deception and connect them with damage in
different contexts.
Loosely, Proposition 6 states that m is deceptive if and only if it is dam-
aging when R’s preferences are state specific and Proposition 7 states that m
is strongly deceptive if and only if it is damaging for all possible preferences
of R. More generally, one can imagine that the Receiver’s preferences belong
in a particular set and then try to identify a “further from the truth given
θ” relationship on beliefs with the property that m induces beliefs further
from the truth than n if and only if when R responds optimally to beliefs
induced by m he does worse (in state θ) than when he responds optimally
to beliefs induced by n. One set of restrictions seems especially interesting.
In many settings the state space has structure, either induced by a topol-
ogy or an order. For example, states may have a natural topology and the
Receiver’s preferences are continuous with respect to the topology (or, even
more specifically, R’s set of actions Y is equal to the state space Θ and R
seeks to minimize the distance between his action and the state). In this set-
ting, I can equate deception with inducing beliefs that are further from the
true state, and the topology on Θ provides guidance about what “further”
means. I believe that there are analogs to Propositions 6 and 7 that asso-
ciate damaging behavior with inducing beliefs that shift weight away from
the true state in a given direction. The definitions I use treat all states that
are not equal to the true state symmetrically. The alternative could identify
“nearby” states, so that one could say that a distribution that places proba-
bility one half on θ−1 and θ+ 1 is “closer to the truth” than one that places
probability one half on θ − 2 and θ + 2.
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I close the section with a brief discussion of three alternative definitions.
My notions of deceptive and damaging messages take as a baseline be-
liefs and payoffs to the Receiver that are available if the Sender alters her
behavior. An alternative is to take prior beliefs and prior optimal actions
as a benchmark. From this perspective, a message would be deceptive if
it induces beliefs that are less accurate (in some sense) than the prior and
damaging if the message lowers the Receiver’s payoff relative to the prior
optimal action. This alternative definition has two features that I view as
shortcomings: first, there are examples in which the Sender’s message will
be classified as deceptive even if it does not influence beliefs (for example,
if the beliefs are independent of the message); second, there are situations
(although they require non-equilibrium behavior) in which the Sender can-
not avoid sending a deceptive message. There is one economically relevant
situation in which the definition will make alternative classifications: Partial
disclosure provides information that improves upon the prior (so it is not
deceptive in the alternate sense), but it is deceptive in my sense when full
disclosure is possible. I believe that it is consistent with the literature to call
a message persuasive if it leads the Receiver to take an action different from
the one he would take on the basis of prior information only.
The Federal Trade Commission [9] established guidelines that define de-
ception. FTC identifies three necessary conditions for deception. First, de-
ception requires doing something that misleads the consumer. Second, it
evaluates the impact from the perspective of a consumer who acts reason-
ably. Third, for a practice to be deceptive it must have a material impact on
a consumer. The FTC notion of misleading information is consistent with my
definition of deception. In particular, the policy explicitly states that omit-
ting information may be deceptive. One cannot deceive unless there is an
alternative message that provides more useful information. My definition can
incorporate the condition that one evaluates impact from the perspective of a
reasonable consumer. In my model, what is important is the Sender’s beliefs
about how the Receiver interprets messages.23 Finally, my definition leaves
out the third condition. The FTC argues that deception requires studying
the effect of a message on what the Receiver does. In Austin’s terminology,
this means it views deception as a perlocutary act. Instead, I classify decep-
23There are (at least) two possible ways in which the Receiver can be reasonable: He can
be credulous or he can be fully rational. Presumably mixtures of credulous and rational
beliefs may be viewed as reasonable. What constitutes deception will in general depend
on what is viewed as reasonable behavior.
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tion as illocutionary. My notion of damaging statements captures all three
of the conditions that the FTC requires for deception. It is sensible for the
FTC’s concept to include damage, because the purpose of its guidelines are
to promote efficient outcomes and protect consumers.
Philosophers also discuss deception. Mahon [26] contains an overview.
He presents several variations, but all involve an action by the Sender in-
tentionally causing the Receiver to hold a false belief. Consistent with my
definition, deception in these treatments involves manipulating beliefs; de-
ception does not directly refer to consequences; and deception is an inten-
tional act.24 Moreover, these notions separate deception from lying because
deception does not require making statements (actions or gestures can be
deceptive). My definition associates deception with inducing beliefs that are
less accurate than other beliefs that may be induced. In Mahon [26] false
beliefs appear to correspond to what I call inaccurate beliefs. If this is the
case, I view the definition as too broad for many strategic settings, because
it may be that inducing accurate beliefs is not compatible with equilibrium.
6 Charades and Bluffs
Informally, deception involves purposeful behavior by S that induces R to
have inferior beliefs. Damaging messages are purposeful acts that lower R’s
payoff. That is, when the Sender damages the Receiver, the Receiver loses.
Section 5 discusses perlocutionary aspects of communication from the view-
point of the Receiver. This section studies perlocutionary acts from the per-
spective of the Sender. Although the Sender cannot distort her information
to influence her (current) beliefs, it is common that she will lie and deceive
to influence her own payoffs. Section 6.1 contains definitions and Section 6.2
describes some properties.
6.1 Definitions Charades and Bluffs
If R knows the state, then, following the message m, he will take action
yR(θ,m, x) (I allow for the possibility that the Receiver’s response depends
directly on S’s action) and the Sender’s utility is US(θ,m, x, yR(θ,m, x),m).
24Fallis [14] provides a similar treatment. He also introduces the notion of deceptive
lies. In my terms, mθ′ is a deceptive lie given θ and µ if θ
′ 6= θ and µ(· | θ′) 6= I(· | θ).
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Definition 9 (Charades) The action (m,x) is a charade given θ and yR(·)
if there exists (n, z) such that
US(θ,m, x, yR(θ,m, x)) < US(θ, n, z, yR(θ, n, z)).
S’s behavior is a charade if she does not send the message she would send if
R were fully informed. Charades and damaging messages are clearly different
in this formulation: The Sender’s preferences determine what is a charade.
The Receiver’s preferences determine what is damaging. Loosely, a Sender
engages in a charade if the existence of private information distorts her be-
havior. Charades need not distort the Receiver’s beliefs. When a charade
does cause the Receiver to have incorrect beliefs, it is a bluff.
Definition 10 (Bluffs) The action (m,x) is a bluff given θ and yR(·) if
(m,x) is a charade and (m,x) is deceptive.
By analogy with earlier definitions, I say that a strategy (m∗, x∗) is a
charade (bluff) given y(·) if there exists θ such that (m∗(θ), x∗(θ)) is a charade
(bluff).
Damage, charades, and bluffs refer to payoffs, so they all are perlocution-
ary properties. The basic model treats the informed Sender differently from
the uninformed Receiver. Consequently I do not define charades and bluffs,
which refer to the Sender’s payoffs, symmetrically with damage, which refers
to the Receiver’s payoffs. Specifically, there is limited interest in studying ac-
tions of Senders that damage the Sender (presumably she would avoid them)
and limited interest in studying whether the Receiver would act differently
with complete information (typically he would).
6.2 Properties
As with deception and damage, the Sender can avoid charades (and hence
bluffs) by selecting (m¯, x¯) to maximize US(θ,m, x, yR(θ,m, x)).
It is apparent that charades are not possible in equilibria of perfect-
information games, where, by definition, the Receiver knows what the Sender
knows. Charades are also impossible in cheap-talk games.
Proposition 10 If (m∗, y∗, µ∗) is an equilibrium of a cheap-talk game, then
for all θ, m∗ is not a charade given θ and y∗.
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Remark 11 If (m∗, x∗, y∗, µ∗) is a separating equilibrium, then (m∗, x∗) is
not a bluff given any θ and y∗(·).
Remark 11 follows because the Receiver has accurate beliefs in a separat-
ing equilibrium.
Proposition 10 demonstrates that deception need not be a charade, be-
cause deception is possible in cheap-talk games. Conversely, a charade need
not be deceptive. Consider the separating equilibrium in a standard Spence
signaling game. On one hand, there is no deception, because the Receiver
learns the Sender’s type. On the other hand, the Sender’s message is a cha-
rade. If the Receiver knew the Sender’s type, then there would be no reason
for the Sender to invest in costly signaling. When education does not add to
productivity, it is a charade whenever the Sender invests a strictly positive
amount. When education does add to productivity, it is a charade to over
invest.
There is a connection between lying and charades. Suppose that the
Sender believes that the Receiver is credulous. The Sender expects her mes-
sage to be taken literally. If she responds optimally to her beliefs, then
whenever she chooses to send a dishonest message, she weakly prefers the
payoff she receives when dishonest to the payoff received when honest. If
this preference is strict, then the lie is a charade.
Poker is perhaps the canonical example of a game in which there is bluff-
ing. In poker, a player bluffs by making large bets with a poor hand.25 If
the bluffer’s opponents knew the true quality of her hand, they would be in-
clined to “call” the bet. The bluffer would lose. A bluff is successful precisely
because the opponents lack information.
I make a few more comments about poker to illustrate the definition.
First, even rational opponents will associate large bets with good hands and
might “fold,” allowing the bluffer to win. Bluffs are certainly consistent
with rational behavior. Second, lies need not be part of the bluff. A bet in
poker is an indirect statement about the quality of one’s hand, but it is not
constrained by natural language. Third, bluffing behavior in poker (or in any
25Ho¨rner and Sahuguet [20] present a model of “jump bidding” in auctions that can be
viewed as a model of poker. This paper describes an overbid from a weak player as a bluff
and an underbid from a strong player as a sandbag. They show that both bluffing and
sandbagging are possible in equilibrium. Both bluffs and sandbags in the sense of Ho¨rner
and Sahuguet are bluffs in my sense. I cannot distinguish the two phenomena because I
do not assume that types are ordered.
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zero-sum game) cannot induce accurate beliefs. Bluffs do not arise in two-
player zero-sum games in pure-strategy equilibrium, but, except in unusual
cases, if the Sender plays a mixed strategy in equilibrium she is bluffing.26
Charades may arise even if the Sender and Receiver have common prefer-
ences over actions. Suppose, for example, that types, messages, and actions
are elements of {0, 1} and US(θ,m, y) = −(y − θ)2 − .1m and UR(θ,m, y) =
−(y − θ)2. In this case, m = 1 is more expensive than m = 0 for both
types of Sender. There are separating equilibria, but one type must send the
costly message m = 1. If the Receiver knew the Sender’s type, then S would
strictly prefer to send m = 0. This charade is not a bluff. This game also
has a pooling equilibrium in which there is no bluffing. Charades need not
arise if one added a round of pre-play, cheap-talk communication.
7 Examples
This section describes five examples and fits them into the paper’s framework.
The first two examples involve equilibrium models with rational agents, the
other examples involve some kinds of behavioral agent.
7.1 Costly Lying
Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani [22] study a model of communication with
costly lying. They identify conditions for separating equilibria in a Sender-
Receiver model in which the Sender’s message enters directly into the Sender’s
preferences. They offer several applications of their model. In one interpreta-
tion, the message space and the state space are identical and the Sender’s util-
ity is decreasing in the distance between the message and the true state. This
specification identifies the language with the state and provides a tractable
way to model costly lying. In this equilibrium, the Receiver is fully informed
in equilibrium and the Sender’s messages are not deceptive. According to
my definition, Remark 6 implies that there is no deception. Because the
equilibrium is separating, there are no bluffs (Remark 11). In another inter-
pretation, a fraction of Receivers are credulous (and believe that the Sender
26The strategy will be a bluff if (a) the Receiver will change his behavior if he know the
realization of the Sender’s strategy and (b) the Receiver’s choice influences the Sender’s
payoffs.
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honestly reports the true state). In a separating equilibrium, the credulous
Receivers are deceived and the Sender’s strategy is deceptive.
Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani [page 95, Footnote 3][22] “view decep-
tion as the act of inducing false beliefs by means of communication, and
exploiting them to one’s own advantage. Such false beliefs are clearly incom-
patible with traditional equilibrium analysis.” The definition of deception
that I offer is different in several respects. First, I do not limit deception
to communication; actions may be deceptive. Second, for Kartik, Ottaviani,
and Squintani, beliefs are false if and only if they are inconsistent with prior
information and equilibrium strategies. With this definition, as they say,
false beliefs are incompatible with traditional equilibrium analysis. Third,
according to my definition deception need not be disadvantageous to the
Receiver nor advantageous to the Sender. Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani
appear to view inducing false beliefs as the essence of deception. They treat
the property that the Sender benefits from deception as an implication of
optimizing behavior.
7.2 Feints
Hendricks and McAfee [19] present a model of feints. In their setting, an
informed Sender learns the value of q ∈ [0, 1]. The Sender then selects an
investment m ∈ [0, 1]. The Receiver observes a binary message (in {0, 1}),
which is a stochastic function of m. On the basis of the message that the
Receiver observes, he selects y ∈ [0, 1]. Let p denote the probability that the
Receiver hears the message 0 (p depends on m) and let qˆ be the expected
value of q. When the Sender takes the action m and the Receiver responds to
the message i with yi, the payoff of the Sender is q(m−py0−(1−p)y1)+(1−
q)(1−m−py1−(1−p)y0). The payoff of the Receiver is qˆU(y1)+(1− qˆ)U(y0),
where U(·) is increasing and concave. Hendricks and McAfee’s interpretation
of the model is that the Sender and Receiver do battle on two fronts. The
parameter q determines the relative value of the different fronts. The Sender’s
payoff at each front is the difference in resources directed at the front. The
Receiver’s payoff at a front depends only on the resources he directs to that
front.
Under these conditions, the Sender would like to apply all of her resources
to the more likely front while, at the same time, convince the Receiver to
direct his resources to the less likely front. In equilibrium the Sender bal-
ances these two incentives. Hendricks and McAfee demonstrate that there is
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a mixed-strategy equilibrium. The mixed-strategy equilibrium involves bluff-
ing (because the Sender would not follow her strategy if the Receiver could
directly observe q), damage, and deception (because the choice of m influ-
ences the signal the Receiver obtains, which will lead the Receiver to take
a poor decision with positive probability). I would not classify any message
as a lie, because the formulation of the game does not provide an accepted
meaning to the signals.
In this example, two features of the general model come into play. First,
the Receiver does not observe the Sender’s message perfectly. That is, the
binary signal the Receiver hears is a stochastic function of the Sender’s ac-
tion. I do not permit this in the basic model, but discuss the variation in
Section 8.1. Second, the Receiver’s payoff does not depend on the Sender’s
message. This illustrates the importance of the distinction I make between
m and x.
7.3 Behavioral Model of Lying about Intentions
The first two examples illustrate how deception arises in models with rational
agents. It is perhaps less surprising to observe that deception arises in models
with behavioral agents. Nevertheless, it is useful to show how my basic model
is general enough to include some behavioral applications.
Crawford [10] analyzes a behavioral model of cheap talk about intentions.
This study is relevant to my analysis because it demonstrates how deception
arises when some agents do not have accurate beliefs about their opponents’
behavior. He assumes that there is an underlying 2 × 2 zero-sum game
that is preceded by a round in which one party (the Sender) can make a
statement. The zero-sum game has a unique equilibrium; in the equilibrium
both players play non-degenerate mixed strategies. The statement is made
in a natural language. Either the Sender says: “I am going to play UP” or
she says “I am going to play DOWN.” Following the statement, the Sender
and Receiver play the underlying game. The Nash Equilibrium of this game
requires the Receiver to play the equilibrium (mixed) strategy following either
statement, for the Sender’s statement to convey no information, and for the
Sender to play her equilibrium strategy in the underlying game after any
message she makes. According to my definitions, the equilibrium involves
lying (because the Sender’s statement does not describe her intentions), no
deception (by Remark 5 since the Receiver’s beliefs do not depend on the
Sender’s statement), and no bluffing (because the Sender has no private
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information).
Crawford analyzes the game assuming that the players respond optimally
to beliefs that are not necessarily accurate. He concentrates on a small num-
ber of plausible behavioral types: Senders who always honestly reveal their
intentions; Senders who always lie about their intentions; Receivers who take
the Sender’s message literally; and Receivers who believe that the Sender
will not do what she says. With these changes, the game fits into the general
framework of my model. The credulous Receiver type and the truthful Sender
type create a commonly understood language and the Sender’s message con-
veys information about her type. For fixed fractions of behavioral types, he
characterizes the equilibrium behavior of sophisticated agents, who respond
optimally to the (non-strategic) behavior of their behavioral opponents and
the (strategic) behavior of their sophisticated opponents. Crawford demon-
strates that when the population frequencies of sophisticated agents are low
and parameter values are generic, sophisticated agents play pure strategies in
equilibrium. Note that formally my model considers communication about
private information rather than communication about intentions. It still ap-
plies to Crawford’s analysis because including behavioral types transforms a
message that describes intentions in the original game into one about pri-
vate information. Under this interpretation, for interesting parameter values
the Sender will lie and the lies will deceive a fraction of Receivers. These
Receivers will be damaged by the Sender. Deception arises in Crawford’s
model because some agents have incorrect beliefs and other agents exploit
these beliefs.
7.4 A Behavioral Model of Deception
Ettinger and Jehiel [13] present an alternative model of deception that, like
Crawford’s model, is based on the possibility that agents hold inaccurate
beliefs. Ettinger and Jehiel provide a simple example that illustrates their
model. They analyze a model based on a 2×2 zero-sum game Γ, with payoffs
given in the table below. The stage game has a unique equilibrium. There
is therefore a unique subgame-perfect equilbrium of the twice-repeated game
when played by conventional (sophisticated and rational) agents. Deception
is not possible.
Ettinger and Jehiel demonstrate the possibility of deception in an analogy-
based sequential equilibrium. In their model, the Row player’s first-period
action can be used to deceive the Column player. Specifically, they identify
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an equilibrium in which the rational Row player plays U in the first period
and plays D in period 2 if Column played L and U otherwise; the coarse
Row player plays U in both periods; and the Column player plays L in the
first period, and plays R in the second period if Row played U in the first
period and L in the second period if the Row player begins with D. The
outcome of the game is (U,L) followed by (D,R) when the Row player is
rational and (U,R) when the Row player is coarse. In this setting, the Row
player’s move in the first period influences Column’s beliefs about Row’s
type. It plays the role of the message, m, in my model. The Column player
observes m. The Row player’s second-period action plays the role of x in my
model. Damage involves second-period payoffs, which do not directly depend
on Row’s first-period choice. The Column player views the first-period play
of D as evidence that Row is rational (because the coarse Row player never
plays D) and believes that Row is coarse with probability 2/3 following U .
This belief is objectively incorrect because Row plays U in the first period
independent of type. Column has this belief in an analogy-based equilibrium
because Column cannot distinguish first- and second- period actions. Hence
Column thinks that the probability of coarse given U is, by Bayes’s Rule,
.5/(.5 + .25), where the numerator is the probability of both coarse and U
(the ex ante probability of coarse, .5, times the probability that coarse plays
U , 1) and the denominator is Column’s view of the probability of observing
U (the probability of coarse Row and U plus the probability of Rational Row
and U – the last term is .25 because Column, unable to distinguish first- and
second-period actions, believes that Rational Row players play U one half
of the time). For my analysis, the origin of these beliefs is less important
than the fact that the rational Row player understands them. So Rational
Row’s first-period choice can influence what Column expects. If Rational
Row starts with U , then Column will believe that Row is more likely to
play U than D in the second period; consequently Column will play R. It
is (strongly) deceptive and damaging when Rational Row begins by playing
U . This action leads the Column player to obtain a lower payoff than if the
first period’s action was D. According to my terminology, Rational Row is
bluffing when she plays U in the first period because she would not follow
that strategy if Column knew Row’s intentions. This application shows the
value of permitting the Sender in my model to select an action as well as a
message.
This example and the following one illustrate how my model applies to
setting in which beliefs are neither formed as part of a standard equilibrium
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nor are completely credulous.
L R
U 5,−5 3,−3
D 0, 0 7,−7
7.5 Projection Bias
Madara´sz [25] models another type of bias in beliefs. He assumes that players
suffer from “projection bias.” In his model, a privately informed agent may
assume that her opponent has access to her information (even when this is not
true). One of the examples in Madara´sz’s paper involves a communication
game. The structure of the game is slightly more general than the basic games
that I study because the Receiver has private information. The Sender learns
the value of a binary state, which is equally likely to be 0 or 1. The Receiver
has private information about his cost of verifying the Sender’s message.
After learning the state, the Sender sends a binary message (m = k has
the commonly accepted meaning “the state is k” for k = 0 and 1). The
Receiver decides first whether to audit the statement; an audit costs c > 0
and reveals the state perfectly. Denote by a the audit decision (a ∈ {0, 1},
a = 1 means audit and a = 0 means do not audit). Second, the Receiver takes
an action y based on his private information. The Receiver seeks to minimize
the distance between the state and the action ((y − θ)2) plus auditing costs
(if any). The Sender’s preferences are given by Bm − Pma(1 − θ) where
P > B > 0. The first term in the Sender’s preferences reflects the amount
B she earns from making a positive report; the second term reflects the
penalty she must pay if she makes the report m = 1, she is audited (a = 1),
and the state is low (θ = 0). In equilibrium (for sensible distributions on
auditing costs), the Sender reports honestly when θ = 1 and randomizes
when θ = 0. The Receiver responds to m = 0 by never auditing and setting
y = 0. When m = 1 he audits when his cost of auditing is low (and selects
y = θ) and does not audit when the cost of auditing is high and sets y
equal to the conditional expectation of θ (which is strictly between .5 and
1. According to my definitions, the Sender lies with positive probability
(because she sometimes reports m = 1 when θ = 0); deceives and damages
(because when θ = 0 and she reports m = 1, the Receiver would be better off
if the Sender had told the truth); and bluffs (because when the Sender lies,
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she both deceives the Receiver and she makes a statement that she would
not have made had the Receiver been fully informed). In this situation,
deception is consistent with equilibrium. Both players have accurate beliefs,
but incomplete information gives the Sender an opportunity to mislead R
(and take advantage of this). Of course, in equilibrium, R’s expectations are
rational.
Madara´sz is interested in what happens when the Receiver in this example
has projection bias. In this case, the Receiver believes with probability ρ
that the Sender actually knows his cost of auditing (with probability 1 − ρ
the Receiver accurately believes that the Sender does not know the auditing
cost). The Sender is sophisticated (in the sense that she knows R’s projection
bias); she adjusts the frequency of lies in equilibrium in response to R’s bias,
but her strategy does not depend on the auditing cost. Equilibrium still
involves S reporting honestly when θ = 1 and randomizing when θ = 0. The
Receiver’s strategy depends on the realization of costs. When costs are low,
he audits m = 1 reports and chooses y optimally. When c is a bit higher, R
audits too little (because he projects knowledge onto S and assumes that the
lower cost of auditing will deter lies) and selects actions that are higher than
optimal. When c is higher still, R audits too much and selects actions that
are lower than optimal (because he thinks that S, knowing that auditing is
relatively costly, will lie more). Finally, when c is very high, R will not audit
and will take actions that are lower than optimal (because R thinks that S
will always lie, but S is actually not able to take full advantage of the high
cost of auditing).
From the standpoint of the ideas in this paper, when Receivers are bi-
ased, reporting m = 1 when θ = 0 is still a lie, a deception, and a bluff.
What changes is the equilibrium frequency of deception and the gains from
deceiving.
8 Extensions of the Basic Model
I have studied a simple model. The model identifies central concepts, but
misses important features. This section lists some of the missing elements.
The broad lessons of the basic model are the important distinctions between
locution, illocution, and perlocution; the notion that dishonesty and decep-
tion are compatible with equilibrium; the connection between damage and
deception; and the ability of the Sender to avoid deception, damage, and
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bluffs. These features remain in more general models. At the same time,
making the model more general allows qualitatively different kinds of dis-
honest behavior. The variations are almost certainly going to be important
when the costs of lying and deception are taken into account.
This section reviews some of the possible variations.
8.1 Noise in Messages
I assume that the Receiver hears the message m perfectly. It is possible
to extend the model so that the Receiver’s observation is a (potentially)
stochastic function of m. One would need to augment the model with a
function ν(m′ | m) that specifies the probability that R observes m′ given
that S sends the message m. For each m, ν(· | m) ≥ 0 and ∑m′∈M ′ ν(m′ |
m) = 1. The difference between the Sender’s message and the Receiver’s
observation is important in the model of Hendricks and McAfee [19] that
I discussed in Section 7.2. Dziuda and Salas [12] is a recent model that
investigates the implications of assuming m′ 6= m. Another leading example
is if Sender and Receiver speak different dialects or are familiar with different
norms of behavior.
The definition of lying does not need modification in this case, but a
variation is possible. If the Sender knows µ, then she may be able to modify
what she says so that what the Receiver hears is (approximately) the true
state. So it is possible to evaluate lies from the perspective of what the
Receiver hears rather than what the Sender says.
From the Sender’s perspective, the beliefs she induces are of the form
µ(θ | m′) = ∑m′ µ(θ | m′)ν(m′ | m). One can define accuracy and deception
in terms of µ′ instead of µ. The analysis of damage, charades, and bluffs
carries over without change.
8.2 Imperfect Knowledge of State
I have assumed that the Sender knows the state. More generally, one can
imagine that the Sender obtains imprecise information about the state. A
standard way to describe the Sender’s information is through a joint probabil-
ity distribution over states θ and signals received by the Sender (ω). Viewed
in this way, the definition of lying extends trivially assuming that the ac-
cepted meanings correspond to statements about ω. That is, the Sender
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talks about what she observes, rather that the state of nature. This exten-
sion leaves open a couple of problems of interpretation.
If S receives noisy information, then there are different ways to lie. The
Sender can make a statement that she believes contains a state that is possible
and a state that she believes is impossible. For example, if Θ = {1, 2, 3} and
S learns that the state is in {1, 2}, then m{1,3} is a lie given θ = 2 and is
true given θ = 1, but should be evaluated given the Sender’s information
(θ ∈ {1, 2}). Alternatively, the Sender can make a statement that excludes
states that may be possible. For example, S may learn that θ > 1 and
report that θ = 3. I view the first statement as a lie given θ = 3 and the
second statement as a lie given θ = 2, but it is also possible to view these
statements as lies given what S observes. (That is, the first statement is a
lie given ω = {1, 2}).
8.3 Probabilistic Statements
I assume that the language associates words to subsets of Θ. It is possible
that the language has words for probabilistic statements (“I believe that θ is
equally likely to be 0 or 1.”).
Suppose that there are two states, θ1 and θ2, that are equally likely ex
ante and that the Sender receives an informative, but imperfect, signal of
the true state. If the only statements that have accepted meaning available
to the Sender are of the form θ ∈ T , for T = {θ1}, {θ2}, or {θ1 ∪ θ2}, then
it could be the case that both Sender and Receiver benefit if the Sender lies
and says “the state is θ1,” when she believes (only) that θ1 is highly likely.
One can remedy this problem if the Sender has access to a language that
permits her to make statements about her posterior (“state θ1 is much more
likely than θ2”). It is difficult to evaluate whether statements like this are
honest in one-shot settings.
I am not sure whether to call a probabilistic statement a lie. On one hand,
if we knew that a weather forecaster has expert information that identifies the
chance of rain as 95%, then I would want to classify a report that the chance
is 5% as a lie. On the other hand, it may be difficult to document that the
forecaster has probabilistic information and, if so, an observer cannot know
with certainty that the forecaster has lied. Formally, the issue comes down
to what is the right definition of the state space. In order to classify incorrect
probabilistic statements as lies, one need only interpret the set of probability
distributions over Θ as the state space and have a language that includes
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messages with accepted meaning for all elements of this larger state space.
Adding noise in messages, imperfect knowledge, and probabilistic state-
ments create no barriers to formal modeling. I believe that in practice the
cost of lying and deception depends strongly on these assumptions. Investi-
gating this belief goes beyond this paper.
8.4 Heterogeneous Beliefs
It is standard to assume that there is a common-knowledge information struc-
ture (P (·)), but this restriction may be inappropriate in models with bound-
edly rational agents. It is useful to consider variations of the model in which
the Sender and Receiver have different beliefs about the prior distribution
over θ. In such a situation, the concepts that I introduce should be viewed
from the perspective of the Sender. That is, the model applies to a situation
in which different players have different beliefs. The beliefs that appear in
definitions will be those of the Sender. With this variation especially (but
also when there are noisy messages), it is likely that there will be a difference
between the intention to deceive and whether, in fact, the Sender succeeds
in deceiving.
8.5 More General Games
I studied two-player games with a limited dynamic structure. Adding agents
does not influence the definition of lying. It raises the possibility that actions
may deceive or damage subsets of opponents. Adding stages creates new
context, requiring the need to evaluate honesty of communication not only
with respect to the true state, but also with respect to the history of play.
Anderson and Smith [2] study a dynamic model that has features of the
static models of Crawford [10] and Hendricks and McAfee [19] mentioned in
Section 7. In this model, an informed agent must trade off short-term benefits
from exploiting private information with the long-term benefits of keeping
the information hidden. Equilibrium play exhibits (generalized versions of
deception, damage, and bluffing. Sobel [31] studies a dynamic model of com-
munication. Communication is cheap talk, but there is a natural way to add
accepting meaning to the messages. The paper characterizes an equilibrium
in which the informed Sender with interests opposed to those of the Receiver
deceives the Receiver by telling the truth. On the equilibrium path, honest
statements make the Receiver more confident that the Sender has common
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intests, enabling the Sender to exploit the Receiver in the future. Honesty
induces inaccurate beliefs because the Receiver does not expect honest infor-
mation in equilibrium.
8.6 Communication About Intentions
In this paper, the Sender’s message corresponds to information about the
state of the world. That is, S communicates about exogenous information.
People also make statements about their intentions. At the end of an interac-
tion, one can interpret statements of the form “I will deliver the product by
Friday,” or “I am going to the opera.” In these situations messages refer to
future actions rather than states of the world. Strictly speaking, my model
does not apply to these situations, but it is straightforward to modify defi-
nitions so that commonly accepted meanings refer to outcomes rather that
states. Without changing the model, it is possible to characterize communi-
cation about intentions as deceptive (to the extent that influence R’s beliefs
about future actions).
Two of the examples (Crawford [10] in Section 7.3 and Ettinger and
Jehiel [13] in Section 7.4) involve communication about intentions. In both
cases, the authors add uncertainty about the state of the world into a model
so that the Receiver learns about intentions by drawing inferences about the
state of the world.
8.7 Incorporating Costs of Lying and Deception
One motivation for providing a systematic treatment of lying and deception
is to deal with the informal observation that some people seem to lie less than
basic economic models predict.27 These studies suggest that lying is costly.
They also suggest that the nature of the cost may depend on consequence
(whether the lie lowers someone else’s monetary payoff), context (includ-
ing whether there is an audience), and expectations (for example, whether
others lie in similar situations). Although I offer a narrow definition of lie
that focuses only on the relationship between what the Sender believes and
what she says, these results indicate that the cost of lying depends on many
other factors. The good news is that my formulation is flexible enough to
27Ariely [3] is a review of evidence aimed at a popular audience. Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-
Heusi [15] and Gneezy [17] are two of many papers that present laboratory experiments
demonstrating that many people are unwilling to lie for monetary rewards.
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include costs that depend on these features. The bad news is that the strict
classification of lies as locutionary acts breaks down when one takes costs
into account. I have provided a benchmark model that can incorporate lying
costs. It is an empirical question to describe these costs.28 There is a smaller
experimental literature on deception, but again my model provides a way to
include costs of deception in a strategic model.
28Abeler, Nosenzo, and Raymond [1] provide an excellent meta-analysis of the experi-
mental literature on lying costs.
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Appendix (for Print)
Proof of Proposition 1. In a CS cheap-talk game, there are only a finite
number of actions induced in any equilibrium. The equilibrium partitions
the type space into intervals with disjoint interiors. Hence any equilibrium
type-action distribution can be generated by an equilibrium that uses only a
finite number of messages with positive probability. Let φ(θ) be the partition
element containing θ. In the equilibrium, if θ′, θ′′ ∈ φ(θ), then y(θ′) = y(θ′′).
Lemma 1 implies that one can relabel the messages so that m(θ) has the
commonly accepted meaning “my type is θ′” for θ′ /∈ φ(θ). This establishes
Proposition 1 for CS cheap-talk games. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose (6) holds. It follows that p = µ(θ |
m)/µ(θ | n) ∈ [0, 1). Let ρ be defined by:
µ(θ′ | m) = pµ(θ′ | n) + (1− p)ρ(θ′).
Hence ρ(θ) = 0 and
∑
θ′∈Θ ρ(θ
′) = 1. Further, if (6) holds, then ρ(θ′) ≥ 0
for all θ′ ∈ Θ. Hence n is deceptive.
Conversely, if there exists ρ and p such that (4) holds, then
µ(θ | m)/µ(θ | n) ≤ µ(θ′ | m)/µ(θ′ | n) for all θ′ such that µ(θ′ | n) 6= 0,
with strict inequality for at least one θ′ if µ(· | m) 6= µ(· | n). Hence
Condition (6) must hold. 
Proof of Proposition 4. It is known that any equilibrium type-action
distribution in the CS model, there are a finite number of actions induced;
denote these actions by y1 < y2 < · · · < yN . There exist 0 = θ0 < θ1 < · · · <
θN−1 < θN = 1 such that types in (θi−1, θi) induce action yi. Let m∗(θ) = mi
for θ ∈ [θi−1, θi) and m∗(1) = mN . Let
y∗(m) =
{
yi if m = mi for i = 1, . . . , N
y1 otherwise
and
µ∗(A | m) =
{
P (A∩[θi−1,θi))
P ([θi−1,θi))
if m = mi for i = 1, . . . N
P (A∩[θ0,θ1))
P ([θ0,θ1))
otherwise
,
where P (·) is the prior distribution. m∗(θ) is not deceptive given θ and y∗
because each Sender type can induce only one accurate belief and does so in
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equilibrium. (If θ ∈ [0, θ1), then type θ can induce the same accurate belief
in many ways.). 
Proof of Proposition 6. If Condition (6) holds, then µ(θ | m)/µ(θ′ |
m) ≤ µ(θ | n)/µ(θ′ | n) for all θ′. Hence if y(θ) is a best response for R given
µR(· | m) it must be a best response for R given µ(· | n).
If Condition (6) fails, then there exists θ′ and α(θ), α(θ′) > 0 such that
µ(θ | m)
µ(θ′ | m) >
α(θ′)
α(θ)
>
µ(θ | n)
µ(θ′ | n) .
It follows that for significantly small choices of α(θ′′) for θ′′ 6= θ, θ′, when
R’s preferences are determined by α, µ(· | m) induces the action y(θ) while
µ(· | n) induces the action y(θ′). 
Proof of Lemma 2. Let V (p) ≡ pUR(θ, y¯(p))+(1−p)EUR(θ, y¯(p)), where
the expectation is with respect to γ. Let p′ > p. It follows that
V (p) ≥ UR(θ, y¯(p′)) + (1− p)EUR(θ, y¯(p′)) (9)
and so
V (p) ≥ V (p′)− (p′ − p) (UR(θ, y¯(p′))− EUR(θ, y¯(p′))) (10)
and hence
UR(θ, y¯(p′))− EUR(θ, y¯(p′)) ≥ V (p
′)− V (p)
p′ − p .
Similarly,
V (p′)− V (p)
p′ − p ≥ U
R(θ, y¯(p))− EUR(θ, y¯(p))
so that
UR(θ, y¯(p′))− UR(θ, y¯(p)) ≥ EUR(θ, y¯(p′))− EUR(θ, y¯(p)). (11)
The definition of y¯(p′) implies that
p′UR(θ, y¯(p′)) + (1− p′)EUR(θ, y¯(p′)) ≥ p′UR(θ, y¯(p)) + (1− p′)EUR(θ, y¯(p))
so either UR(θ, y¯(p′)) ≥ UR(θ, y¯(p)) or EUR(θ, y¯(p′)) ≥ EUR(θ, y¯(p)). It
follows that the left-hand side of inequality (11) is positive, which establishes
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the first part of the result. If y¯(p′) is not a best response to pµS(θ)+(1−p)γ,
then the inequalities in (9) and (10) are strict, which establishes the second
part of the lemma. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that the Receiver obtains utility 0 in each
state if he takes any action y 6= y∗. Let v(θ) be the utility from action y∗ in
state θ. The lemma follows because, by the separating hyperplane theorem,
it is possible to find v(·) such that∑
θ
v(θ)γ(θ) =
∑
θ
v(θ)µS(θ) > 0 >
∑
θ
v(θ)γ′(θ). (12)

Proof of Proposition 9. In equilibrium, S selects her message m to
maximize: US(θ, x, y∗(m)). When US = UR, an equilibrium message must
maximize u¯R(θ, x,m), which means that the message is not damaging. 
Proof of Proposition 10. In a cheap-talk game, if R learns θ, then S’s
payoff is US(θ, yR(θ)) independent of message. Hence S would not strictly
gain by changing her message. 
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